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Twenty years ago, in a crowded federal courtroom for the Northern 
District of California, Fred Korematsu uttered a simple request: "I would 
like to see the government admit that they were wrong and do something 
about it so this will never happen again to any American citizen of any 
race, creed, or color.,,1 Korematsu and his team of young lawyers were 
there that day to argue for vacating his 1942 conviction for disobeying 
military wartime exclusion and detention orders, and to end the public 
stigma of disloyalty imprinted by the original Korematsu decision onto the 
Japanese American community. Unearthed documents had revealed that 
no military necessity existed to justify the incarceration, and that 
government decision makers knew this at the time, and later lied about it to 
the Supreme Court? On that day, November 19, 1983, forty years after the 
United States Supreme Court upheld his conviction, Judge Marilyn Hall 
Patel reversed Korematsu's conviction, acknowledging the "manifest 
injustice" done to him and to all those interned.3 
In the original 1944 Korematsu decision, the United States Supreme 
Court upheld the mass incarceration of 120,000 Americans of Japanese 
ancestry during World War II without charges, notice, trial or due process, 
and without any evidence of espionage and sabotage by persons of 
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1. Record for Motion to Vacate Conviction and Dismiss Indictment of Fred T. Korematsu at 32, 
Korematsu v. U.S., 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984); see also PETER IRONS, JUSTICE DELAYED: THE 
RECORD OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES 221 (Peter Irons ed., 1989}. Peter Irons, the 
attorney and scholar who found most of the original evidence and who had contacted all three coram 
nobis Petitioners to reopen their cases, deserves special credit for his insistence that Japanese American 
attorneys lead the coram nobis effort. He recognized the political value of these legal cases not only to 
the general public but to the legal community as well. 
2. See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1416-18 (N.D. Cal. 1984). 
3. Id. at 1416-17. 
37 
38 ASIAN LA W JOURNAL [Volume 10:37 
Japanese ancestry.4 Despite the Court's lofty pronouncements that it would 
subject the government's discriminatory actions to the highest level of 
scrutiny, it nevertheless took judicial notice of innocent facts, half-truths, 
and stereotypes of Japanese Americans5 to weakly conclude: "we cannot 
reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities and ·of 
Congress that there were disloyal members of that population, whose 
numbers and strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained.,,6 As 
a consequence, over 100,000 Japanese Americans remained imprisoned, 
later to carry into private life the stamp of disloyalty approved by the 
Supreme Court.7 
Nearly every law student has studied the 1944 Korematsu case. Legal 
scholars continue to debate, dissect, and discuss its abstract principles-
"strict scrutiny," "delegation of powers," and "due process." Many, 
however, never discuss the political or moral issues raised by the mass 
imprisonment of Japanese Americans. Nor do they examine the 
devastating human cost of this decision-the suffering, broken families, 
lost property, and shattered dreams. Perhaps most importantly, many fail 
to mention that the later coram nobis cases found that the government, in 
its argument to the Supreme Court, had fabricated the "military necessity" 
basis for the incarceration in order to justifY the mass imprisonment, and 
that the internment had resulted in a manifest injustice warranting 
reparations.s Korematsu v. United States represents a compelling lesson in 
law but an untaught tragedy in history. 
Now, it appears, Korematsu and the national security and civil 
liberties tensions that it embodies have reemerged in the wake of the 
September 11, 2001 ("September 11") terrorist attacks. Peter Kirsanow, a 
controversial Bush appointee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, cited 
the original Korematsu case to support his predication of a new racial 
internment of Arab Americans.9 The FBI has also been harshly criticized 
4. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
5. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 323 U.S. 81,96-98 (l943). In accepting the government's 
request for judicial notice in Hirabayashi, the Court attached significance to sociological assertions that 
Japanese American children attended Japanese language school, which were believed to be sources of 
Japanese nationalistic propaganda; that approximately 10,000 children of Japanese ancestry had been 
educated in Japan; that many of the children had dual citizenship, possessing both Japanese and 
American citizenship under Japanese law; and that many of the resident alien Japanese "occupy 
positions of influence in Japanese communities." Id at 97-98. 
6. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218 (citing Hirabayashi, 323 U.S. at 99). 
7. Eric K. Yamamoto & Susan Kiyomi Serrano. The Loaded Weapon, 28 AMERASIA J. 51, 56 
(2002) [hereinafter Yamamoto, et aI., The Loaded Weapon]. 
8. Eric K. Yamamoto & Susan Kiyomi Serrano, American Racial Justice on Trial-Again: 
African American Reparations. Human Rights and the War on Terrorism, _ Mich. L. Rev. _ 
(forthcoming 2003). 
9. See id; Chisun Lee, Rounding Up the 'Enemy:' Sixty Years After It Jailed Japanese 
Americans. Would the u.s. Consider Another Ethnic Internment?, THE VILLAGE VOICE, July 31-Aug. 
6,2002, available at http://www.villagevoice.comlissues/023l/lee.php(lastvisitedSept.ll. 2002). 
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by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court for lying to the court to 
obtain national security wiretaps and electronic surveillance. lo The Bush 
administration has even established military tribunals for civilians that the 
Justice Department has deemed "enemy combatants," with no right to 
judicial review. I I In turn, civil liberties organizations have challenged the 
secretive, indefinite, and unexplained national security detention of 
individuals. 12 
In the 1984 Korematsu coram nobis decision, Judge Patel underscored 
the urgent need for America's institutions-including the courts-to 
actively protect cherished civil liberties, especially in times of national 
crisis: 
[Koreinatsu] stands as a constant caution that in times of war or declared 
military· necessity our institutions must be vigilant in protecting 
constitutional guarantees. It stands as a caution that in times of distress 
the shield of military necessity and national security must not be used to 
protect governmental actions from close scrutiny and accountability. 13 
Does Korematsu v. United States have continuing vitality today? 
When the government abuses its national security powers, .and is 
challenged, will the Supreme Court overlook Judge Patel's warning and 
blindly adopt a deferential as opposed to a heightened standard of review in 
evaluating the government's contention of "national security" or "military 
necessity?,,14 What is the significance of the original Korematsu case and 
later coram nobis cases to Asian Americans? To all those concerned about 
justice in A,merica? To our country and its legal institutions? These are all 
questions that are very much alive today. 
10. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court's decision was overturned by the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review. See In re Sealed Case, Nos .. 02-00 I, 02-002 (United States 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review Nov. IS, 2002); see also Alisa Solomon, Things We 
Lost In the Fire: While the Ruins of the World Trade Center Smoldered, the Bush Administration 
Launched an Assault on the Constitution, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 11-17, 2002, available at 
http://www.villagevoice.comlissues/0237/solomon.php. 
I L See infra Section II (Civil Liberties in a Post-9III World). 
12. See Solomon, supra note 10; Charles Pope, Fear Grows That War on Terror is Trampling 
Rights, SEATTLE POST-INTELLlGENCER, Sept. 10, 2002, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.coml 
nationaI/S63ISJightslO.shtml; CIVIL LiBERTIES AFTER 9/11: THE ACLU DEFENDS FREEDOM (Sept. 
20,2002), available at http://www.aclu.org/Files/OpenFile.cfm?id=IOS97. 
13. Korematsu v. United States, 5S4 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. CaL 1984). 
14. See Eric K. Yamamoto, Korematsu ReVisited-Correcting the l1y'ustice of Extraordinary 
Government Excess and Lax Judicial Review: Time for a Better Accommodation of National Security 
Concerns and Civil Liberties, 26 SANTA CLARA L REV. 1, 4-5 (1986) [hereinafter Yamamoto, 
Korematsu Revisited]. 
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I. THE WARTIME AND CORAM NOBIS CASES 
A. The Wartime Cases 
On February 19, 1942, President Franklin Roosevelt issued Executive 
Order 9066, granting the Secretary of War the power to exclude all persons 
of Japanese ancestry from designated military zones on the West Coast. 
Thereupon, the government banished 120,000 Japanese Americans-:-two-
thirds of whom were native-born U.S. citizens-from the West Coast and 
imprisoned them in ten desolate camps without charges, attorneys, 
indictment, or hearings. The internees were forced to abandon their homes, 
farms, and businesses with only what they could carry. They remained 
behind barbed wire under the watch of armed guards. 15 
Three Japanese Americans-Fred Koreinatsu, Minoru Yasui, and 
Gordon Hirabayashi l6-each challenged the internment (specifically the 
curfew and exclusion) as a violation of their equal protection rights, among 
other arguments. The government had alleged that: 
[A]II Japanese, including American citizens, were, by culture and race, 
predisposed to loyalty to Japan and to disloyalty to the United States; 
[the] Japanese on the West Coast had committed and were likely to 
commit acts of espionage and sabotage against the United States; and [ ] 
mass action was needed because·there was insufficient time to determine 
disloyalty individually. I? 
However, the government offered virtually no evidence to support these 
bald assertions. All three were convicted of violating the military orders 
and all three appeals reached the Supreme Court. 
Fred Korematsu's case was decided by the Supreme Court in 1944, 
eighteen months after the Court rendered its decisions in Hirabayashi v. 
United States 18 and Yasui v. United States. 19 The three cases (collectively, 
"Wartime Cases") upheld the government's claim of "military necessity" 
for the curfew and exclusion, as well as by implication, the detention of 
Japanese Americans, despite the total absence of evidence that any 
Japanese American had engaged in acts of espionage or sabotage.2o In 
15. See ERIC K. YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE 
AMERICAN INTERNMENT 100-01 (2001). 
16. Of the three cases, the authors have chosen to highlight the Korematsu case for two reasons: 
(I) Minami's role as lead counsel for Fred Korematsu, and (2) the most significant deprivations-
exclusion and detention-were central issues in the original Korematsu decision. 
17. Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited, supra note 14, at 8- 9. See also Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81,99 (1943). 
18. 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
19. 320 U.S. 115 (1943). 
20. See generally PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN 
INTERNMENT CASES (1983); IRONS, supra note I, at 221; Lorraine K. Bannai & Dale Minami, 
Internment During World War /I and Litigations, in ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT 755 
(Hyung-Chan Kim ed., 1992). 
2003] KOREMATSU V. UNITED STATES 41 
upholding the constitutionality of the government's incarceration plan 
(specifically through sanctioning the curfew and exclusion), the Court 
outlined its heightened duty to scrutinize racial classifications: 
"[D]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by 
their very nature odious to a free people[,]" 21 and "all legal restrictions 
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately 
suspect ... courts must subject .them to the most rigid scrutiny.,,22 In 
affirming the convictions, however, the Court abdicated its responsibility to 
conduct an independent review and deferred entirely to the government's 
falsified assertions of "military necessity" by adopting the military's 
sweeping conclusions about disloyal Japanese Americans. Three scathing 
dissents in the Korematsu case decried this "legalization of racism." 23 
Over the years, Supreme Court decisions in the Wartime Cases have 
been intensely criticized for their blind acceptance of military declarations 
of proof, their embrace of racial stereotypes about Japanese Americans, and 
for the Supreme Court's abdication of its declared legal standard of 
heightened judicial responsibility.24 Yet, as Professor Sumi Cho has 
explained, the Supreme Court continues to cite to Korematsu as precedent 
for its "special duty to scrutinize racial classifications, implying counter-
factually that those cases had actually involved some kind of meaningful 
scrutiny.,,25 The decisions are also remarkable for their spurious logic, 
internal and external inconsistencies,26 and most basically, for the Court's 
approval of naked racism dressed up in the clothes of Supreme Court 
21. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100. 
22. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216 (emphasis added). 
23. Id. at 242 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
24. See Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489, 531 
(1945) ("The first and greatest anomaly of the Hirabayashi [and] Korematsu ... cases is that they seem 
to abandon the requirement of a judicial inquiry into the factual justification for General DeWitt's 
decisions .... [T]hese cases treat the decisions of military officials, unlike those of other government 
officers, as almost immune from ordinary rules of public responsibility. " On this ground alone, the 
Japanese American cases should be most strenuously reconsidered."); Sumi Cho, Redeeming Whiteness 
In the Shadow of Internment: Earl Warren. Brown. and a Theory of Racial Redemption, 40 S.c. L. 
REV. 73 (1998); Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American Redress and the 
"Racing" of Arab Americans as "Terrorists. " 8 AsIAN L.J. 1,5-6 (2001); Arval A. Morris, New Deal 
Symposium: Justice. War. and the Japanese-American Evacuation and Internment, 59 WASH. L. REV. 
843, 860-61 (1984) ("[T]he cases reflected the failure of the legal system that should have stood as a 
bulwark resisting racism, war hysteria, and the failure of leadership at high levels of government. .. It 
is capable of revival and repetition. The Japanese-American exclusion cases should be reversed, 
repudiated, and excised from our law."); Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited, supra note 14, at 20-21. 
25. Cho, supra note 24, at 142-43. 
26. For example, the Court in Korematsu stated "[w]e uphold tile exclusion order as of the lime it 
was made and when the petitioner violated it." Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219 (emphasis added). 
However, as 'support for its conclusion that some Japanese Americans retained loyalty to Japan, the 
Court pointed to the results of loyalty questionnaires given to Japanese American after they had 
already been interned: "That there were members of the group who retained loyalties to Japan has been 
confirmed by investigations made subsequent to the exclusion. .." Id. The Court thus applied 
irrelevant time periods for the convenience of bolstering the government's case. 
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magniloquence. 
B. The Coram Nobis Cases 
After Japanese Americans were released from the camps, many 
returned to the West Coast, while others made their homes wherever they 
could. They attempted to rebuild their lives, find jobs, raise families, and 
forget the hardship, humiliation, and stain of disloyalty on their reputations 
by the government's imprisonment. For almost 40 years, Japanese 
Americans rarely talked about their experiences in the prison camps. But, 
as part of the Japanese American Redress Movement,27 several attorneys 
suggested the idea ofrelitigating the original Wartime Cases. 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, two noted Nisei (second generation) 
attorneys, Frank Chuman and William Marutani, independently proposed 
an obscure legal procedure-a writ of error coram nobis-to relitigate the 
Wartime Cases. This writ, a civil/criminal hybrid similar to habeas corpus, 
allows a petitioner to challenge his or her conviction after the sentence has 
been completed. It is available, however, only in very rare circumstances 
when one can demonstrate an error "of the most fundamental character. ,,28 
The insurmountable obstacle of the coram nobis idea at that time was 
simple: no evidence was then available to prove that government 
misconduct had resulted in an injustice to Korematsu, Hirabayashi, or 
Yasui. No evidence, that is, until Peter Irons and Aiko Yoshinaga-Herzig29 
uncovered a clear trail of reports, notes, and memoranda penned by 
government lawyers and high civilian leaders which showed that the 
Department of Justice and War Department suppressed, altered, and 
destroyed important evidence during the prosecution of these three cases in 
order to win them at any cost. This evidence demonstrated that: (1) 
government prosecutors suppressed authoritative intelligence reports 
showing that Japanese Americans, as a whole, were loyal;30 (2) General 
DeWitt's original Final Report was altered, the original Final Report was 
27. The "Redress Movement" was a campaign begun by Japanese Americans in the early 1980s 
to obtain recognition by the United States government that the incarceration of Japanese Americans was 
unnecessary and unjust. The campaign resulted in a formal apology, reparations of $20,000 to those 
living at the time of the Redress Bill's signing in 1987, and the establishment of a $5 million 
educational trust fund. See YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION, supra note 15, at 
278-80, 390. 
28. Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1419. 
29. At the time of their discovery of critical evidence in late 1981, Peter Irons was a professor of 
political science at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst and an attorney researching a book 
about the attorneys in the original Korematsu and Hirabayashi cases. Professor Irons' obtained most of 
his dramatic evidence through a Freedom of Information Act request. Aiko Yoshinaga-Herzig was a 
housewife on a personal odyssey to discover the real reasons she and her family were forced from their 
home in Los Angeles into internment camps. She found the bulk of her evidence through a laborious 
review of files in the National Archives. Their fortuitous meeting at the National Archives in 
Washington D.C. led to an agreement to share all documents and evidence they obtained. 
30. Bannai, et aI., supra note 20, at 775. 
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destroyed, and an altered report was submitted to the Supreme Court to 
support the government's position;3! and (3) General DeWitt's allegations 
of espionage and sabotage by Japanese Americans were false and known to 
be false by government attorneys who failed to inform the Supreme Court 
of this deception.32 
With his experience as a historian and attorney, and having previously 
filed his own petition for coram nobis, Irons was keenly aware of the 
significance of the evidence that he and Yoshinaga-Herzig found. Legal 
teams were assembled in the respective venues of each petitioner's 
conviction (Gordon Hirabayashi in Seattle, Minoru Yasui in Portland, and 
Fred Korematsu in San Francisco), and they coordinated their legal 
research and preparations of the petitions. 
Based on the newly discovered evidence, Korematsu, Hirabayashi, 
and Yasui filed Petitions for Writs of Error Coram Nobis in January and 
February 1983, to erase their World War II convictions on the grounds that 
prosecutorial misconduct had indelibly tainted the United States Supreme 
Court's decisions. However, the petitions were filed to accomplish more 
than just the overturning of the petitioners' convictions. In the midst of the 
Japanese American Redress Movement, the legal teams wanted to 
undermine the legal precedents which upheld the incarcerations; correct the 
public historical record and the public perception that legitimate reasons 
existed for the exclusion and detention; and vindicate these three 
courageous men who stood up, virtually alone, to challenge the 
discriminatory military orders. 
In November 1983, Fred Korematsu's case was the first to be heard in 
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The 
U.S. government did not contest Korematsu's request that his conviction be 
vacated. In fact, it attempted to withdraw its prosecution of Mr. Korematsu 
31. Id. 
32. Rostow, supra note 24, at 776. DeWitt's Final Report "contained an astonishing statement 
about the military's rationale for the evacuation: due to racial characteristics it was impossible to 
distinguish the loyal Japanese Americans from disloyal Japanese Americans and therefore it did not 
matter whether there was adequate time to determine disloyalty individually[:] 'It was impossible to 
establish the identity of the loyal and the disloyal with any degree of safety. It was not that there was 
insufficient time in which to make such a determination; it was simply a matter of facing the realities 
that a positive determination could not be made, that an exact separation of the "sheep from the goats" 
was unfeasible.'" Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited, supra note 14, at 10 (citing Korematsu Petition for 
Writ of Error Coram Nobis, Jan. 19, 1983). The Report was altered to read: "To complicate the 
situation, no ready means existed for determining the loyal and disloyal with any degree of safety." Jd. 
at II (citing Korematsu Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis, Jan. 19, 1983). As Professor 
Yamamoto observed, this alteration "shifted the justification for the evacuation from unsupportable 
racial myths to logistical practicalities." Id. The government's brief in Hirabayashi claimed that there 
was insufficient time for individual loyalty investigations and hearings. Id. The Hirabayashi Court 
thereby upheld the curfew orders, noting that "DeWitt had determined that the Japanese American 
population included disloyal members [who] ... could not readily be isolated and separately dealt with 
by other means." Id. (citing Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 99). The Korematsu Court also cited this passage 
from Hirabayashi. Id. at 12 (citing Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218). 
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in a desperate gambit to prevent any factual findings on the allegations of 
prosecutorial misconduct and lack of military necessity for the exclusion 
and detention. The Korematsu legal team, however, demanded specific 
factual findings by the court that the internment was unjustified. 
Dale Minami, one of Korematsu's attorneys, pressed the court to 
consider not only Fred Korematsu's interests, but also the interests of the 
public and of the Japanese American community as a whole. Such interests 
demanded "more than a sterile recitation that we should let bygones be 
bygones and requires that the real substantial reasons be exposed so that 
this tragedy will never be repeated." Fred Korematsu then addressed the 
court, recalling his initial appearance forty years before when he was 
"handcuffed and arrested as a criminal" and ended with this request: "I 
would like to see the government admit that they were wrong and do 
something about it so this will never happen again to any American citizen 
of any race, creed or color.,,33 
From the bench, Judge Patel announced that a court review of the 
misconduct allegations was appropriate. She stated that the justification of 
"military necessity" for the executive and military orders was based on 
"unsubstantiated facts, distortions, and representations of at least one 
military commander, whose views were seriously infected by racism.,,34 In 
the later written opinion, the court held that government officials lied to the 
Supreme Court about the national security risks requiring imprisonment 
when it "knowingly withheld information from the courts when they were 
considering the critical question of military necessity in this case.,,35 The 
court also took judicial notice of the conclusions of the Commission on 
Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians36 that: (1) no military 
necessity existed to justifY the mass incarceration of an entire ethnic 
populace; and (2) racial animosity fueled the military orders to imprison 
Japanese Americans. Accordingly, the writ of coram nobis was granted 
and Fred Korematsu's conviction was vacated.37 
In Minoru Yasui's case, heard in the United States District Court for 
the District of Oregon, the government again moved to vacate and dismiss 
the indictment. Rather than hearing the evidence presented and entering 
33. Record at 32, Koremalsu; see also IRONS, supra note I, at 221. 
34. Record at 32, Koremalsu. 
35. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406,1417 (N.D. Cal. 1984). 
36. ld. at 1416 ("The Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians was 
established in 1980 by an act of Congress. It was directed to review the facts and circumstances 
surrounding Executive Order 9066 and its impact on American citizens and permanent resident aliens; 
to review directives of the United States military forces requiring the relocation and, in some cases, 
detention in internment camps of American citizens, including those of Japanese ancestry; and to 
recommend appropriate remedies." (citing Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of 
Civilians Act, PUb. L. No. 96-317, § 2, 94 Stat. 964 (1980»). 
37. Although the government filed a notice of appeal in the Koremalsu case, the appeal was 
withdrawn and the decision became final. Bannai, et aI., supra note 20, at 775. 
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any findings on the issue of prosecutorial misconduct, the court granted the 
government's request and vacated the conviction. Yasui appealed this 
order, but passed away while the appeal was pending. Minoru Yasui had 
received his vindication but without any findings of fact.38 
Gordon Hirabayashi's case took a more tortuous route. Alarmed by 
the strong decision rendered in the Korematsu case, the government 
contested the petition. The Seattle coram nobis team took Hirabayashi's 
case to a full trial on his petition. The district court vacated his conviction 
for violation of the exclusion order, but upheld his conviction for violation 
of the curfew order. Both parties appealed. The appeal was argued before 
the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on March 2, 1987. In a 
unanimous opinion, it affirmed the district court's vacatur of the exclusion 
conviction and reversed the district court as to the curfew conviction.39 In 
echoing the findings of Judge Patel, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the 
altered, suppressed, and destroyed evidence may have materially affected 
the original Supreme Court decisions.40 Gordon Hirabayashi's 40-year-old 
convictions were finally erased from his record. 
II. THE ENDURING SIGNIFICANCE OF KOREMATSU 
A. Civil Liberties in a Post-9/I I World 
In her opinion, Judge Patel underscored the urgent need for America's 
institutions to actively protect cherished civil liberties, especially in times 
of national crisis. Yet, following the horrific events of September 11, the 
Bush administration, despite Judge Patel's warning, expanded its vast 
executive and military powers to pursue its "war against terrorism." It has 
incarcerated civilians-including American citizens-indefinitely without 
charges, hearings, or access to counsel; summarily detained and deported 
immigrants in violation of federal law; and established military tribunals 
for civilians deemed by the Justice Department to be "enemy combatants" 
with no right to judicial review.41 All this has occurred despite the 
government's official acknowledgement of the injustice in the wholesale 
incarceration of Japanese Americans. Sadly, the Bush administration has 
seemingly ignored this history. 
The Bush administration also has unleashed expansive new laws 
designed to address potential threats to the nation's security. The 342-page 
38. ld. at 778. 
39. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 608 (9th Cir. 1987). 
40. See id. 
41. See Anita Ramasastry, Do Hamdi and Padilla Need Company?, Findlaw.com, available at 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasastry/2002082I.html(Aug. 21, 2002) (describing two U.S. citizen 
"enemy combatants," Brooklyn-born Jose Padilla, who has been held indefinitely in solitary 
confinement in a military detention camp, and Yaser Esam Hamdi, a Louisiana-born U.S. citizen, who 
is being held in a military brig although no charges have been issued against him); Pope, supra note 12. 
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"USA PATRIOT Act" authorizes sweeping new powers for law 
enforcement agencies to wiretap phones, track Internet traffic, conduct 
secret searches, examine private financial and educational records, and 
prosecute anyone who supports a "terrorist.,,42 The law also allows the 
government to detain immigrants for seven days without charges and 
permits the possible indefinite detention of non-citizens without 
meaningful judicial review. 43 The 484-page "Homeland Security Act" 
recently pushed through Congress may authorize a vast electronic dragnet 
to amass information on every American's credit card and banking 
transactions, travel bookings, magazine subscriptions, website and email 
communications, and medicine prescriptions through a "Total Information 
Awareness" program.44 
Furthermore, the administration has authorized the monitoring of 
privileged communications between attorneys and detainees; breached the 
protective wall between criminal prosecutions and national security 
investigations, which was erected to prevent wiretap and surveillance 
abuse; ordered the continued detention of people in custody even after an 
immigration judge has found them eligible for release;45 and launched a 
"terrorist tracking task force" to root out suspected terrorists who overstay 
their visas.46 The FBI and INS reportedly commenced racial profiling 
investigations and detentions of Arab and Muslim Americans. The 
Department of Justice resurrected support for secret trials based on secret 
evidence for the deportation of "dangerous" immigrants.47 Attorney 
General John Ashcroft called for a national Terrorism Information and 
42. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Require,d to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism ("USA PATRIOT Act") Act of2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56 (2001). 
43. USA Patriot Act Boosts Government Powers While Cutting Back on Traditional Checks and 
Balances, at http://archive.aclu.orgicongressIlIJOIOla.html(last visited Feb. 26, 2003); Ann 
McFeatters, Bush Signs Anti-Terror Bill, Says Tough Law Will Preserve Constitutional Rights, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 27, 2001, at A6; Margaret Graham Tebo, Immigration Policy: Two 
Minds With Single Aim, ABA JOURNAL EREPORT, Sept. 21, 2001, at 
http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereportlimmig.html. 
44. See William Safire, You Are a Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14,2002, at A35. The Department 
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Prevention System ("TIPS") program, which would recruit civilians to spy 
on each other.48 
In this climate, and in light of Korematsu, what standards will the 
Supreme Court employ to review governmental "national security actions 
inimical to the civil liberties of Americans?" And what "value choices [will 
be] made to accommodate national security concerns and civil liberties 
when a court, faced with a 'suspect' government classification, adopts a 
deferential as opposed to a heightened standard of review in evaluating the 
government's contention of military necessity?,.49 
B. Lessonsfrom Korematsu: Will the Court Heed Judge Pate/'s Caution? 
In 1984, Judge Patel issued a potent caution: institutions, including 
courts, during national crisis must exercise close scrutiny and vigilance in 
order to "protect all citizens from []petty fears and prejudices."so A key 
principle implied by her caution is a doctrinal one: heightened standards of 
review should not be attenuated when evaluating national security 
restrictions of our cherished civil liberties.s1 The Supreme Court in the 
original Korematsu case and in a range of modern-day cases have ignored 
this principle.s2 One explanation as to why the Bush administration has 
proceeded in a seemingly irreconcilable manner with the historical lessons 
promulgated by the Redress Movement is that the Supreme Court's 
deferential standard of review actually applied in Korematsu has never 
been discarded. In fact, as Professor Yamamoto has observed, some of the 
Supreme Court's modem-day decisions "suggest a disturbing value 
judgment reminiscent of Korematsu: national security concerns, overt or 
latent, specifically defined or broadly general, justify essentially 
unreviewable government restrictions of American civil liberties."s3 Chief 
Justice Rehnquist has supported this principle. In ignoring the Korematsu 
and Hirabayashi coram nobis cases, he has defended the internment as 
legally valid, at least as to first generation Japanese Americans.s4 He also 
advised that the judiciary should defer to the executive branch and military 
during times of war, even in the absence of martial law. 55 
48. See Adam Clymer, Ashcroft Defends Plan for National Hotline on Terrorism, N. Y. TIMES, 
July 25, 2002, at http://www.nytimes.coml2002/07/25/politicsl25CND-PRIV.html. 
49. Yamamoto, Korematsu ReVisited, supra note 14, at 7-8. 
50. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984). 
51. See generally Yamamoto, Korematsu ReVisited, supra note 14, at 31-33 (positing that the 
Supreme Court may attenuate heightened standards of review when evaluating national security 
restrictions on civil liberties). 
52. See United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984); 
Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). 
53. Yamamoto, Korematsu ReVisited. supra note 14, at 3-5. 
54. See Alfred C. Yen, Introduction: Praising with Faint Damnation-The Troubling 
Rehabilitation of Korematsu, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. I (l999) (discussing William H. Rehnquist, 
When the Laws Were Silent, AMERICAN HERITAGE, Oct. 1998, at 77-89). 
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Notwithstanding, some lower courts recently appear to have paid heed 
(at least implicitly) to Judge Patel's warning and have carefully scrutinized 
infringements of our civil liberties. One federal appeals court recently held 
that the Bush administration acted unlawfully in holding deportation 
hearings in secret, based only on the government's assertion that the 
individuals involved have links to terrorism. 56 A federal district court 
judge also ruled that the Bush administration must reveal the identities of 
hundreds of people arrested and detained after the September 11 attacks. 57 
Finally, a federal. district judge recently denied a motion to dismiss an 
airport screeners' suit, which contends that a post-September 11 federal law 
barring non-citizens from working as airport screeners is unconstitutional.58 
When these and other cases reach the Supreme Court, will it heed 
Judge Patel's caution and scrutinize harsh restrictions of civil liberties? Or 
might we have a replay of 1944's Korematsu? No definitive answers 
emerge. What is clear, however, is that all concerned about both the 
nation's security and civil liberties today have a vital role in ensuring that 
our institutions exercise the vigilance called for by Judge Patel.59 Asian 
Americans, especially, have a unique role to play. 
C. Political Mobilization and the Special Role of Asian Americans 
Today, a broadly conceived political identity is critical to the defense 
of civil liberties. In 1942, Japanese Americans stood virtually alone, 
without allies, and suffered the banishment of their entire race. Forty years 
later, Japanese Americans, supported by Americans of all colors, were able 
to extract an apology and redress from a powerful nation. That lesson of 
the need for political empowerment was made even more obvious after 
September 11, 2001, when Arab and Muslim American communities, 
politically isolated and besieged by hostility fueled by ignorance, became 
targets of violence and discrimination. 
In the aftermath of September 11, Japanese Americans knew from 
history that the United States, which turned on them in 1942, could repeat 
itself in 2001. Therefore, on September 12, 2001, the Japanese American 
Citizens' League, the oldest Asian American civil rights organization in the 
country, immediately issued a press release warning against racial 
discrimination against Arab and Muslim Americans and supporting their 
56. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002). 
57. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. United States Dep't of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 
2002). 
58. See Gebin v. Mineta, No. 02-0493 (Nov. 13, 2002) (order denying a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim). But see In re Sealed Case, Nos. 02-00 I, 02-002 (United States Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review Nov. 18, 2002) (granting the Department of Justice vast 
authority to expand wiretapping and other surveillance). 
59. Yamamoto et aI., The Loaded Weapon, supra note 7, at 59-60. 
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civil rights.6o Other Japanese American individuals and groups have 
offered their friendship, political support, and solidarity with Arab and 
Muslim Americans. 
Japanese Americans also knew from their Redress experience that 
political power was the strongest antidote. The coram nobis legal teams 
understood the political dimensions of their cases and adopted a course of 
litigation that would discredit the Wartime Cases by undermining the legal 
argument that the Supreme Court had legitimized the World War II 
exclusion and detention. This impaired (though did not overturn) the value 
of Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui as legal precedents for mass 
imprisonments of any definable racial group without due process. The 
even larger vision of these cases, however, was the long-term education of 
the American public. Many still believed (and continue to believe) that 
there were valid reasons for incarcerating Japanese Americans en masse: 
the coram nobis cases strongly refuted that notion and boldly illuminated 
the essentially political nature of the judicial system. In doing so, the 
coram nobis cases have contributed to the public's education about the 
frailty of civil rights and the evanescence of justice in our courts. As such, 
these cases highlight the need for continuing political activism and constant 
vigilance to protect our civil rights. 
In today's climate of fear and uncertainty, we must engage ourselves 
to assure that the vast national security regime does not overwhelm the 
civil liberties of vulnerable groups. This means exercising our political 
power, making our dissents heard, publicizing injustices done to our 
communities as well as to others, and enlisting allies from diverse 
communities. Concretely, this may mean joining others' struggles in the 
courts, Congress, schools and union halls; organizing protests against secret 
arrests, incarcerations, and deportations; building coalitions with other 
racial communities; writing op-ed essays or letters to politicians; launching 
media campaigns; donating money; and writing essays and articles.61 
Through these various ways, "[0 ]ur task is to compel our institutions, 
particularly the courts, to be vigilant, to 'protect all. ",62 
The lesson of the Wartime Cases and coram nobis cases taken 
together is not that the government may target an entire ethnic group in the 
name of national security; the cases teach us instead that civil rights and 
liberties are best protected by strongly affirming their place in our national 
character, especially in times of national crisis. As Fred Korematsu 
avowed nearly twenty years ago, we must not let our governmental 
60. Press Release, Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) (Sept. 12, 2001), available at 
http://www.globalexhange.org/september1I1JACL091201.html. 
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131, 135-38 (2000) [hereinafter Yamamoto, Beyond Redress]; Yamamoto et aI., The Loaded Weapon, 
supra note 7, at 60. ' 
62. Yamamoto et aI., The Loaded Weapon, supra note 7, at 60. 
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institutions mistreat another racial group in such a manner again. To do 
this, we must "collectively [turn] the lessons learned, the political and 
economic capital gained, the alliances forged and the spirit renewed, into 
many small and some grand advances against continuing harmful 
discrimination across America.,,63 We must become, as Professor 
Yamamoto has argued, "present-day social actors, agents of justice, 
because real, hard injustices are occurring all around us every day to Asian 
Americans and other racial communities and beyond.,,64 
63. Yamamoto, Beyond Redress, supra note 61, at 138. 
64. fd. at 134-35. 
